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Abstract
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Policy Research Working Paper 5143
Female education levels are very low in many developing 
countries. Does maternal education have a causal impact 
on children’s educational outcomes even at these very low 
levels of education? By combining a nationwide census 
of schools in Pakistan with household data, the authors 
use the availability of girls’ schools in the mother's birth 
village as an instrument for maternal schooling to address 
this issue. Since public schools in Pakistan are segregated 
by gender, the instrument affects only maternal education 
rather than the education levels of both mothers and 
fathers. The analysis finds that children of mothers with 
some education spend 75 minutes more on educational 
activities at home compared with children whose mothers 
report no education at all. Mothers with some education 
also spend more time helping their children with school 
work; the effect is stronger (an extra 40 minutes per 
day) in families where the mother is likely the primary 
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care-giver. Finally, test scores for children whose mothers 
have some education are higher in English, Urdu (the 
vernacular), and mathematics by 0.24–0.35 standard 
deviations. There is no relationship between maternal 
education and mother’s time spent on paid work or 
housework—a posited channel through which education 
affects bargaining power within the household. And there 
is no relationship between maternal education and the 
mother’s role in educational decisions or in the provision 
of other child-specific goods, such as expenditures on 
pocket money, uniforms, and tuition. The data therefore 
suggest that at these very low levels of education, 
maternal education does not substantially affect a 
mother’s bargaining power within the household. Instead, 
maternal education could directly increase the mother’s 
productivity or affect her preferences toward children’s 
education in a context where her bargaining power is low.What Did You Do All Day? Maternal Education and Child Outcomes 
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Educating women is often viewed as the single most effective policy lever for improving incomes 
and impacting a wider set of human development outcomes in low-income countries. In their roles as 
mothers, women also pass on additional benefits of education to their children. This paper contributes to our 
understanding of inter-generational causal links in three ways. First, causal studies have focused on countries 
with high levels of female education; the typical margin studied has been the additional impact of secondary 
schooling or college education.1 However, in much of the developing world, levels of female education are 
abysmally low. The average woman aged 25 and over in 2000 reported 3.2 years of education in India and 
Kenya, 0.5 years in Niger, 2.6 years in Guatemala and 1.2 years in Pakistan (Barro and Lee, 2000).  We study 
whether the benefits of maternal education for child outcomes extend to such low levels of education. To 
isolate causal effects, we employ an instrumental variables approach where our instrument affects only 
maternal education, rather than the education of both fathers and mothers. Second, we broaden our outcome 
measures to child-learning in addition to educational attainment; to our knowledge, this is the first study in 
low-income countries to do so. Third, we demonstrate the importance of maternal and child time-use 
patterns in understanding the unique role mothers play in their children’s lives. 
This paper uses unique primary data from rural Pakistan—a country characterized by low maternal 
levels of education—to address the link between maternal education and their children’s educational 
outcomes. We examine the difference between mothers with no education (75 percent of mothers in our 
sample) relative to those with some education reported by the remaining 25 percent (10 percent report higher 
than primary education and 15 percent primary schooling or less).2 We develop causal estimates of the affect 
of maternal education by taking advantage of the gender segregated nature of schooling in the country and 
use the availability of girls’ schools in the mother’s birth village as an instrument for her education. Since boys 
cannot attend female schools, this instrument affects only the mother’s education levels rather than the joint 
education levels of mothers and fathers. We present detailed maternal time-use, child time-use and child 
learning as evidence for the causal impact of maternal education on child educational outcomes.  
                                                 
1 See Black and others, 2005, Currie and Moretti, 2003 and Berhman and Rosenzweig, 2002. 
2 The average years of education in our sample of mothers is 1.34 years which accords well with the 1.21 years reported in Barro and 
Lee (2000) dataset for females above the age of 25 in Pakistan.   3
The instrumental variable approach shows that the children of mothers with some education (relative 
to uneducated mothers) spend more time on educational activities outside school hours. The effect is large—
an extra 75 minutes per day—and closely aligned with the results from Behrman and others (1999). Mothers 
with some education also spend more direct time with children on their school work.  In households with no 
older children (>12 years) where the mother is likely to be the primary care-giver, time spent by mothers with 
some education directly with children on school work is large (an extra 40 minutes per day). In addition, 
mothers with some education facilitate learning by employing other members of the household in helping and 
reading to children by an extra 4.64 hours per week. Finally, and as a likely consequence of the increased time 
spent studying at home, there is a large impact of maternal education on child test-scores. Children of 
mothers with some education report test-scores that are between 0.24 and 0.35 standard-deviations higher 
than others; this represents to our knowledge the first causal estimate of maternal education on child learning 
outcomes in low-income countries. Given the poor learning environment in developing countries (see the 
TIMSS Report 2007, Andrabi and others, 2009, for Pakistan and Das and Zajonc, 2009, or the ASER Report, 
2008 for India) even the “educated” mothers in our sample can barely read, write or perform simple 
mathematical operations. The results therefore shed light on how maternal education has an effect on child 
outcomes even at very low levels of cognitive achievement.  
We also present supporting evidence that these effects are unlikely to arise from  additional leverage 
“educated” mothers might have in the household’s decision making process. This rationale asserts that 
educated mothers have more say in the bargaining process that takes place between the adult members of the 
household, particularly on decisions that directly affect the child such as enrollment. However, we do not find 
any evidence for increased bargaining power due to maternal education. Moreover, we do not see evidence 
for an impact on child outcomes that are more likely to require household-level (joint) decision making. 
Maternal education does not increase spending on child-specific goods and we are unable to detect an effect 
of maternal education on child enrollment although the latter could also be due to a lack of precision in our 
enrollment estimates. These results are therefore consistent with a direct increase in maternal productivity or 
a change in maternal preferences in contexts where bargaining power is low (or non-existent).   4
Our instrumental variable approach follows Currie and Moretti (2003) and Carneiro and others 
(2007) among others. We propose to use the availability of girls’ schools in the mother’s birth village as an 
instrument for her education. We obtain the birth village using verbal recall in interviews with mothers, and 
match this with the census directory of villages and data on schooling availability. The first-stage of this 
instrumental variable specification shows that the presence of a girls’ school in the birth village of the mother 
at the time that she was of primary school-going age leads to a 11 point increase in the percentage of mothers 
with primary education. In years of education, the instrument adds 0.61 years of education for a mother. 
Given the very low levels of overall female education this effect is fairly large. Like in the previous literature 
using a similar instrument, the correlation remains after controlling for a full set of mother’s age indicators 
and county (teshils in Pakistan) of birth fixed-effects. 3 
A prominent characteristic of the Pakistani educational environment leads us to believe that this 
instrument effectively captures the marginal effects of maternal education. Specifically, public schools in 
Pakistan are gender segregated, and at the time that the mothers in our sample were of school age, the only 
viable schooling options were public schools for girls. In previous applications of similar instruments in other 
countries, access to education affects the educational attainment of both girls and boys; discerning which of 
these channels affected the outcome in question is then critical. In our case, the presence of a girls’ school 
affects the educational attainment of girls (the mothers in our sample) thus varying only female education 
levels. We believe that this could somewhat attenuate the possibility that our results are  driven by  
simultaneous improvements in the education levels of fathers, which would be the case if schooling 
availability was not gender specific.  To our knowledge, this is the first application of schooling availability at 
the birth village level in a gender-segregated schooling setting as an instrument for parental education in a low-
income country context. 
Encouragingly, the instrument also passes the falsification tests of the type discussed in Currie and 
Morretti (2003). Specifically, the presence of a girls’ school in the birth village does not affect the mother’s 
education if it was built after she had passed primary school going age. In our specifications, the effect of 
                                                 
3 A tehsil in Pakistan is roughly the administrative equivalent to a county in the US.   5
having a girls’ school in the village of birth is large and significant for mothers who were 7 years or younger 
when the school was built (relative to no school), but is zero for mothers who got a school between the ages 
of 8 and 15, or the age of 15 onwards. Furthermore, given gender segregation in public schools, we are also 
able to confirm that the presence of a boys’ school in the birth village has no effect on mother’s education. To 
the extent that similar village characteristics determine the construction of boys’ and girls’ schools, this offers 
further evidence in support of the exclusion restriction. 
We interpret our results as follows. In the classic model of human capital accumulation (Becker 1985 
and Becker and Tomes 1986), family characteristics should not be causally linked to child outcomes in the 
absence of credit constraints. The literature departs from this neutrality result in one of two ways. In one 
strand of the literature, the unitary model of the household is discarded, so that husbands and wives 
“bargain” with the ultimate outcomes depend on the relative weight given to the preferences of the two 
parents. Maternal education increases maternal bargaining power and if mothers care more about child 
outcomes than fathers (see for instance, Lundberg and others, 1993, 1997) an inter-generational link may be 
established. A second strand of the literature highlights the labor force participation channel. More educated 
mothers are more likely to participate in the labor force. If child-care is not fully contractible, then the effect 
of maternal education depends on the relative importance of higher income versus direct maternal presence, 
and the impact of maternal education on maternal presence. See, for instance, Cawley and Liu (2007) or 
Miller and Urdinola (2007) for evidence on the maternal employment-child outcomes link in the US and 
Colombia. The link between maternal education, employment and child outcomes is unclear. Bianchi (2000) 
shows in the US that maternal time with children remained unchanged between 1965 and 1995, during a 
period of dramatic increases in the labor force participation for women. Guryan and others (2008) show that 
while working women spend less time with children in the US, more educated women spend more time with 
their children and work more—because they cut down on leisure activities and housework. They confirm 
similar patterns in 14 other countries for which these data exist. In contrast to the evidence from these 
correlations, Behrman and Rosenzweig (2002) argue that the child educational outcomes are causally worse for   6
educated mothers in the US probably because of lower maternal presence, but they are unable to confirm the 
channel in their data.  
In the Pakistani context, and for that matter in most developing country contexts, both the 
bargaining and the labor force participation channels are likely absent. Women in our sample spend the bulk 
of their time (just under 10 hours a day) on housework and we will demonstrate that there is no causal link 
between female education and labor force participation; indeed there is no link at all between female 
education and time on work outside the house. If increases in bargaining power do arise solely due to higher 
female earnings, the absence of significant levels of labor force participation among women in our sample 
means the bargaining channel is effectively shut off. Commensurate with this line of thought, we find no 
differences in self-reported decision-making regarding children’s schooling between mothers with some 
education and mothers with none. Furthermore, the lack of work outside the house also closes the 
(potentially detrimental) channel of less maternal presence in children’s lives. Instead, mothers with some 
education in our sample are acting within the domestic space they control by making sure that their children 
study more and by spending more time with them and creating a nurturing learning environment, which has a 
positive effect on their children’s learning. As Behrman and others (1999) postulate, when both channels of 
bargaining and of maternal presence in the household are closed, it is likely that the effects of maternal 
education arise from the direct productivity benefits of higher female education, although these findings are 
also consistent with greater maternal preference for education or more information about how much effort is 
required for children to learn. The direct productivity channel suggests that mothers spend more time with 
their children because their marginal product in the production of education is higher; children spend more 
time because maternal and child effort are complements in the production function.  
One question is whether the increase in time that children spend studying is at the expense of “child 
labor”. In particular, if the extent of child labor also represents the bargaining position of the parents, we 
should similarly expect to see little difference in the activities reported by children. Key to our understanding 
of these results is the concept of “idle” children—children who are neither in school, nor at work (see for 
instance, Bacolod and Rajan, 2008, or Ravallion and Wodon, 1999). Primary-school age children in our   7
sample do not spend most of their waking time outside school in housework or paid-work; they spend the 
time playing. In fact, an average child who is in school spends 2.5 hours a day “playing”; an average child who 
is not in school spends just under 3.5 hours “playing”. Given these large numbers, if a mother makes sure that 
her child spends an extra hour a day studying it does not imply any trade-off with other “productive” tasks 
that the child is responsible for, and thus probably avoids any conflict with the husband.  
We feel that these results contribute to our understanding of education in low-income countries in a 
number of different ways. First, given low female labor force participation it is difficult to compute the rate of 
return to education for women in low-income countries. Our results suggest that one way to capture these 
non-labor market returns is through the application of time-use data in household surveys. Second, the 
findings suggest that some reorganization of the dominant line of thought linking maternal education to child 
outcomes may be necessary. Most studies of the inter-generational transmission of human capital show an 
association between maternal education and child enrollment, which are then assumed to be causal. Two 
recent studies (Behrman and Rosenzweig, 2002 and Black and others, 2005) show that in high-income 
countries, the causal effects of maternal education on child attainment levels are absent, or much smaller than 
previously believed. Desai and Alva (1998) argue along the same lines for lower income countries. Similarly, 
we are also unable to find any evidence for a link between maternal education and child enrollment. While 
this could be because our estimates are imprecise, there is a possibility that such a causal link is absent. 
Instead, we are able to document a causal link between child learning and maternal education. This is of direct 
interest for policy, since recent experiments have shown that government policy can increase enrollment 
(Fiszbein and Schady, 2009) while methods of improving learning remain tenuous.  
Section 1: Data Description 
We use a unique dataset on households and children from 112 villages in 3 districts of Punjab—
home to 56 percent of Pakistan’s population. The Learning and Educational Achievements in Punjab Schools 
(LEAPS) study follows a panel of households from 2003-2005 in 3 districts of the province—Attock, 
Faisalabad and Rahim Yar Khan. These districts represent an accepted stratification of the province into 
North (Attock), Central (Faisalabad) and South (Rahim Yar Khan). The villages were chosen randomly from   8
the list of all villages with an existing private school and are therefore bigger and richer than the average 
village in these districts.4 However, it should be noted that almost half of the children in rural Punjab now live 
in a village with at least one private school, like that in our sampling list-frame. Here, we focus on the cross-
section data from 2003.  
Our data cover 1,697 mothers with 4,331 children between the ages of 5 and 15 in these households.5 
In addition to demographic and educational data, the survey also collected detailed parental and child time-
use data, which forms the basis for a series of estimations in the paper. Given that these data are typically not 
available at the disaggregated level collected here (more on this below), a brief description of household 
inputs into education with an emphasis on time-use for a typical mother and a typical child in rural Pakistan is 
instructive. Table 1 provides summary statistics for the variables used in the regression analysis. 
Mothers 
A majority of mothers in our sample—76 percent—report not having gone to school at all and less 
than 10 percent report any education beyond the primary grade-level. Consequently, the average number of 
years of education for mothers is 1.34 years, a number comparable to many other developing countries (Barro 
and Lee, 2000).  Of particular interest are the detailed time-use questions asked of mothers. Time-use is 
computed from a question that reconstructs an “average day in the last week” and allows the respondent to 
flexibly specify activities and time-slots. For instance, a respondent may say that she woke up at 6am, 
prepared breakfast and then readied her children for school till 7am. After that, she cleaned from 7am to 9 
am and so on for the remainder of the day, till she went to sleep. To code the activities reported we used 11 
different codes. Table 2, Panel A shows time allotted to different activities for mothers with no education and 
for those with some education across the five main codes, aggregating the remaining (entertainment, prayer, 
shopping, sickness, religious activity and other) into the residual category of “other activities”.  
Immediately striking is the remarkable similarity in time-use for most categories across mothers with 
some education and those with none. Apart from “rest”, “housework” is the single largest category with both 
                                                 
4 See Andrabi and others (2008) for more details on the rise of low cost, for-profit, secular private schools in rural Pakistan.   
5 Birth village information was not available for all the mothers. Summary statistics are provided for the matched sample of 1437 
mothers. We return to the matching issue below.   9
educated and uneducated mothers reporting approximately 9½ hours a day.  In contrast to the considerable 
allocation of time to housework, mothers work for pay an average of 40 minutes per day and only 11 percent 
of mothers report any paid work at all (conditional on reporting any paid work at all, mothers do report just 
over 6 hours a day on this activity). The average time spent on paid work is slightly higher for uneducated 
mothers (44 vs. 29 minutes/day) compared to mothers with some education. Time spent “looking after 
children’s needs” accounts for 1½ hours a day and is again very similar across education levels—93 minutes 
and 99 minutes for uneducated and educated mothers, respectively. Where we do see some difference across 
maternal educational levels is in the time spent on children’s educational needs—this is virtually 0 for 
uneducated mothers and 20 minutes a day for mothers with some education. These numbers from Pakistan 
accord well with previous work in rural India, where mothers were spending no more than 90 minutes a day 
on childcare (Desai and Jain, 1994). 
Since some paid work is done inside the house and some housework could be outside the house, it is 
further useful to classify total work done—both paid and unpaid—as inside versus outside the house. We do 
so using sub-categories such as cooking, cleaning, livestock and unpaid farm work for every main category in 
our survey. The data present a picture of a mother’s life that is centered largely inside the house. A typical 
mother’s working day involves spending over 8 hours a day inside the house and an hour and 40 minutes 
outside. In fact, if anything, mothers with some education spend less time outside the house (an hour vs. two 
hours) and more time inside (9½  vs. 8 hours) than uneducated mothers. This paucity of paid work and, more 
generally, the fact that the bulk of work is inside the house has implications for bargaining models of 
household decision-making that rely, quite literally, on “outside” options. 
The comparison with the United States is of interest. The Americans’ Time-Use survey data between 
2003 and 2006 show that the average mother spends 13.96 hours a week, or just under 2 hours a day on all 
types of childcare—a number roughly comparable to our categories of “looking after children’s needs” and 
“children’s educational needs”. Of this, the bulk of time is spent on “basic child care” - feeding, medical care, 
putting a child to sleep. 2.1 hours a week, or just less than 20 minutes a day is spent on “educational child 
care”. The gradient of time spent on childcare with maternal education is positive and significant—Guryan   10
and others (2008) show that women with 16+ years of education spend 9.7 hours more  every week on 
childcare relative to high-school dropouts. In contrast to the broad agreement on time spent in childcare, 
Pakistani women allocate a lot more of their time to housework. Non-employed women in the US spent just 
over 3½ hours a day on housework in 1995 and employed women 2½ hours a day (Bianchi and Robinson 
1998-99)—less than a quarter of the time spent by women in our rural Pakistani sample. The difference in 
time allocated to childcare is then perhaps not as large as we may have imagined given the dominance of 
housework in the Pakistani context.6  
Children 
The survey also covered every child between the ages of 5-15 in the sampled households for a total 
of 4,331 children. The mean age for a child in our sample is 10 years and 47 percent of the sample is female. 
Overall child enrollment is 66 percent with girls 10 percentage points less likely to be enrolled than boys; 
given our list frame and the private school explosion in rural Pakistan (see Andrabi and others, 2008), 30 
percent of the children in our sample are enrolled in private schools.  
Child time-use was reported by parents for a typical school-day in the previous week. The main 
categories are: rest, play (unstructured, unsupervised, leisure time), time in school, time spent on educational 
activities (school preparation, homework, formal tutorial sessions), paid work, housework and the residual 
category, “other”. Apart from “Rest,” “Play” is the largest component of the out of school day for the 
children averaging 183 minutes, followed by educational activities at around two hours per day. Less time is 
spent by children on housework and paid work, at 65 and 16 minutes respectively.  Given the concern in the 
literature on issues of child labor, both inside the house and in paid-work, the comparison of these categories 
for enrolled and out-of-school children is of interest. Table 2, Panel B shows that children who are out-of-
school do spend more time on housework—out-of-school children spend 197 minutes on housework 
compared to 24 minutes for children enrolled in school. The extent of paid-work is fairly low with enrolled 
children reporting virtually no paid-work and out-of-school children reporting 62 minutes a day. Of particular 
                                                 
6 The Americans’ Use of Time survey classifies childcare as a primary or secondary activity, where the former is child spent exclusively 
with children while the latter includes time spent on multiple tasks, one of which is with children (such as cooking while supervising 
homework). The usual caveats of comparability across surveys with different questions thus apply in force.   11
interest is that “play-time” for both enrolled and out-of-school children is the single largest time-use category 
of these three in the children’s daily lives. Out-of-school children report 278 minutes per day but even 
enrolled children report more than 150 minutes per day of play time. This play-time for enrolled children 
leaves plenty of “idle” time that can be spent in extra educational work outside the school, without eating into 
either their house or paid-work commitments. This is very much in line with Bacolod and Ranjan’s (2008) 
emphasis on idle time as a third category to be taken into account when discussing the tradeoffs between 
child labor and enrollment.  
The age of the child has a clear association with time-use patterns in these data and Figure 1 explores 
the variation in time-use by the child’s age and the educational status of the mother. There are several 
noteworthy patterns. First, consistent with other studies of time-use (deTray, 1983) children spend more time 
on housework and on paid-work as they age; they also spend less time on play so that, by the time they are 15 
years old, play-time has dwindled to less than 60 minutes compared to 300 minutes when they were 5. For 
children in their teenage years, the burden of housework is quite high. In our companion work, Andrabi and 
others (2009), we discuss the issue of housework and show that this increase in housework is largely 
concentrated among teenage girls who are out-of-school. This issue demands a separate, more focused 
explanation. Second, children of educated mothers spend less time on housework, paid-work and play-time, 
largely because the gradient of time spent in housework and paid-work with age is lower for them. Third, 
these children spend significantly more time across all ages on educational work outside the school. The 
difference is consistent across ages averaging about 40 more minutes a day up to age 10 and more so after 
that—for children with uneducated mothers, homework time declines quite sharply after age 10, while it 
remains constant for children with educated mothers. These data on the time that children spend in study at 
home combined with the relatively small direct involvement of mothers’ time on their children’s education 
suggest that mothers with some level of education, even when they are not directly involved in a child’s home 
study, are creating a space for these children to focus on their schoolwork.  
To assess the link between maternal education and child outcomes, we also used school-based testing 
to assess all enrolled children in Grade 3 in the village. These children were tested in the subjects of English,   12
Urdu (the vernacular) and Mathematics. We then matched the children who were tested in the school to 
children in our household survey, eventually yielding a sample of 676 children for whom we have both test-
scores and household survey data. We use item-response scaled scores as our measure of learning 
achievement. 7  Table 2, Panel C shows a strong correlation between maternal education and child test-scores 
for this smaller sample. The difference of 0.43 standard deviations in English, 0.25 in Mathematics and 0.35 
in Urdu corresponds to roughly 1 additional year of learning in these villages. This is a first indication of a 
link between maternal education and child cognitive outcomes. 
Section 2: Econometric Specification and Identification strategy        
 To establish causal links between maternal education, time-use and test-scores, we require variation 
in maternal education that is arguably exogenous to her ability. Our instrumentation strategy follows an 
established literature first proposed by Card (1999) that uses maternal access to a school in her birth village at 
the time of her enrollment decision as an instrument for educational attainment. We obtain the birth village 
using verbal recall in interviews with mothers, and then match this with the census directory of villages, the 
national census of schooling conducted by the Government of Pakistan and the Educational Management 
Information System data collected by the Government of Punjab and the National Education Census 2005. 
This allows us to obtain the year of formation of schools in all villages in Pakistan.   
We match 85 percent of all mothers (1,437 of 1,697) with their birth village information. The primary 
reason for missing mothers was that in the data entry process, the English spelling of the village name was 
often spelt in different ways making it harder to match to the census directory. In addition, some mothers 
give their village name as a residential location that is smaller than the official census village designation.8  
While there is some possibility that “more able” mothers are able to provide better verbal recall information, 
we do not find any correlation between the probability of a match and village or maternal characteristics. 
Table A1 in the Appendix provides the means of important variables for the matched and unmatched sample. 
For all the variables, the differences are negligible.  Only differences in age are significant at the 10 percent 
                                                 
7 IRT scores ensure that change in one part of the distribution is equal to a change in another, in terms of the latent trait captured by 
the test. All items were modeled using the three parametric logistic (3PL) item response function and estimated using BILOG-MG. 
8 The Surveyor General of Pakistan mapping information on localities does not follow the census village designation and has many 
localities marked that are not in the census list. A digital village area map for Pakistan does not exist!   13
level, but the difference is qualitatively small (0.2 years for children). In the matched sample that we use for all 
our estimations, mothers are split evenly between those living in the same village they were born in (44 
percent) and those born outside the current village (56 percent).  
Two important institutional aspects of the educational setting in Pakistan provide further appeal for 
our identification strategy. First, Pakistan does not have universal school coverage in rural areas. Village 
coverage of school construction was ramped up mainly as a result of the Government of Pakistan’s Sixth 5-
year plan in the early 1980s. Because school construction took place over a period of time, we have women of 
different ages living in the same village that they were born in with differential access to schooling at the time 
of their enrollment decision. This allows us to exploit within village variation in schooling opportunities for 
mothers who have not moved from their birth village. Further, part of our identification is also based on the 
mothers who report a different birth village from the current village of residence. Second, as a matter of 
policy, the Government of Punjab’s public schooling system is segregated by gender at all educational levels. 
Girls’ schools are prevalent to a lesser degree and are generally of a later vintage than boys’ schools. This 
permits greater current village variations in the data. In addition, it avoids the problem faced in a number of 
other studies of the school construction jointly affecting maternal and paternal schooling. 











  1 0       Pr   (1) 
Here, “MotherEducated” is an indicator variable that takes the value 1 if the mother reports non-
zero years of schooling and 0 otherwise and SchoolPresenti is an indicator variable that take the value 1 if the 
mother had a girl’s school in her birth village when she 7 or younger. The Government of Pakistan’s own 
guidelines use the age of 6 as the normal school starting age, but 7 years is more reasonable given the 
widespread practice of delayed enrollment. A cutoff age higher than that is probably inaccurate since the 
enrollment window for girls in rural Pakistan is quite small. Nevertheless, our results are robust to small 
variations in the specific cutoff and we find that increasing this cutoff to 9 years does not change the results 
significantly.    14
To account for other potentially confounding factors in the IV specification, our first stage includes 
additional conditioning variables. First, the expansion in school construction over the last three decades 
implies that younger mothers had systematically greater exposure to a school at the time of their enrollment 
decision. Since other changes in the environment affecting enrollment are also time-varying, we control for 
age directly in the first-stage with a full set of age dummies—one for each year—for all mothers in the 
sample. Second, it could be that schools were built in a targeted manner in specific villages. We therefore also 
control for a full set of tehsil dummies—a tehsil is an administrative unit one level below the district, equivalent 
roughly in size to a US county. The province of Punjab, where our sample is drawn from, has 34 districts and 
104 tehsils in the latest (1998) census. Since roughly 50 percent of our mothers were born in a different village, 
there are 72 different tehsil fixed effect dummy variables. Given the sample size, including a full set of birth-
village dummies (over 400) leaves us with too little within-village variation to achieve identification.  
 The second stage regressions are therefore specified as follows.  
MotherOutcomesi = γ0 + γ1 MotherEducatedi  + γ2MotherAgei +  γ3BirthTehsili + ξj    (2a) 
ChildOutcomesij = α0 +α1 MotherEducatedi  + α2Agei + α3 BirthTehsilii + α4ChildAgej+ α5ChildGenderj  + εij  (2b) 
Equation (2a) is a mother level equation. The variable MotherEducated is instrumented using the first 
stage regression (1) and is estimated using 2SLS. The variable SchoolPresent, which captures the presence of a 
school in the birth-village at the time of the enrollment decision, is the excluded variable from Equation 2a. 
MotherAge and BirthTehsil are the same variables as in the first stage and are in the second stage regression 
because of their potential direct effect on child level outcomes. All specifications cluster for the standard 
errors at the village-level. Equation (2b) is run at the child level and adds a full set of indicator variables for 
child age and a dummy variable for child gender to the set of explanatory variables. The subscript i refers to 
the mother and j to the child. In the 2SLS estimation, all child-related controls are also included in the first 
stage regression.  
Finally, we also present bivariate probit results with the same specifications as above for all the 
discrete variables used in the analysis. Although the linear IV specifications are unbiased in terms of the Local 
Average Treatment Effects (LATE), the efficiency of the IV estimator is low at the sample sizes that we are   15
working with; the biprobit estimates buy us greater precision, but at the cost of assuming a standard bivariate 
normal distribution over the error terms in Equation (1) and the outcome equations. 
We postpone two important questions regarding the estimation strategy to our discussion on 
robustness and limitations in Section 4. First, we cannot implement an identification strategy that relies solely 
on the interaction between age and the presence of schools as the instrument given the small sample size. We 
show in Section 4 that introducing an additional control for whether the mother’s birth village ever received a 
school does not alter our coefficients, although in some cases we lose precision by doing so. Second, the 
causal effect of maternal education could work entirely through assortative matching. In Section 4, we test 
whether observable attributes of the current household (including spousal education and time-use) are 
causally linked to maternal education. We show that they are not. This suggests that at these low levels of 
education, the assortative matching seen in correlations is likely due to the signaling effects of education 
rather than the education per se. 
Section 3: Results 
First Stage 
Table 3 presents the first-stage regression and the results of two falsification tests to check the 
validity of our instrument. The first column uses mother’s years of education as a dependent variable. The 
next three columns use an indicator variable for whether a mother is educated as the dependent variable; our 
IV results are presented using this indicator variable rather than the continuous version.9 Column 2 runs the 
regression for all mothers in the sample, Column 3 for all enrolled children in the sample as some of our time 
use variables are applicable only for enrolled children and Column 4 for all children in the sample to match 
the IV regressions specifications further below. Columns 5 and 6 present falsification tests.  
Column (1) shows that a girls’ school in the birth-village increases a mother’s years of education by 
0.61 years. Given that the average years of education are 1.34, this is a large increase. Columns (2), (3) and (4) 
show that a girls’ school in the birth village increases the likelihood of a mother reporting some education by 
                                                 
9 We have replicated all our results continuous version of maternal education and all our results are similar. Given that 75 percent of 
mothers in our sample report no education, the difference between mothers with some education and mothers with no education is 
the main source of variation in the data.   16
11.42, 12.05 and 10.96 percentage points respectively.   The increased probability is both statistically 
significant and of a large magnitude since only 25 percent of all mothers reports any education at all. The 
instrument satisfies the criteria for detecting weak instruments discussed in Stock and others (2002), with F-
statistics of 15.86, 13.35 and 14.60 in the three specifications we use in the second stage.  
Even though controls for mother’s age and tehsil fixed-effects should in principle account for 
alternate channels through which school presence could affect child outcomes, further falsification tests make 
a stronger case for the validity of the instrument. These are presented in columns 5 and 6. The first 
falsification test divides mothers into four categories—those that received a girls’ school by age 7, those that 
received a girls’ school between the ages of 8-15, those that received a girls’ school after age 15 and those that 
never received one. Given the enrollment profiles for girls in Pakistan—increasing between ages 5 and 10 and 
dropping quite steeply after that—a valid instrument should imply that receiving a school after the relevant 
age should not have any effect on enrollment. Column (5) shows that the mother born in a village that 
received the school by age 7, relative to one who never received it, is 10 percentage points more likely to 
report some education. For those who received a school between the ages of 8-15 or after 15 years of age 
(relative to having never received it), the effect is small, of the wrong sign and insignificant at all conventional 
levels of confidence. The difference in coefficients between the first age group and the latter two age-groups 
is statistically significant at the 1 percent level. The difference between mothers born in villages that received 
a school after age 15 and between the ages of 8-15 is statistically insignificant.  
The second falsification test reflects the sex-segregated nature of school provision in the province of 
Punjab. If one thinks that unobservable village-level political variables or other factors that resulted in the 
construction of a girls’ school could also affect maternal education through other means than access to 
schooling, our instrument would be invalid. Since the process of setting up boys’ schools should follow a 
similar but independent process, one might expect to see these direct effects to show up, at least to some 
extent in villages with boys schools. Column 6 presents the effects of the presence of a boys’ school in the 
village by age 7 on the mother’s education. The coefficient is small (-0.05) and not significantly different from 
zero.   17
Maternal Education and Time Use:  
Our first set of results examines the difference in time-use patterns of mothers and their children 
across maternal education levels. We use three outcome variables. Recall that we collected data on children’s 
time-use on educational activities outside school; our first outcome variable is the composite time spent by 
children on schoolwork at home, preparation for school and any extra paid tutorials. In addition, a specific 
time-use category was used to record the time spent by the mother on children’s educational needs. This is 
our second outcome variable. Finally, for every enrolled child we specifically enquired how much time was 
spent in helping or reading to the child by any family member during the preceding week. Given a large number 
of mothers and households who report “0” time spent with children on their educational needs, we also 
present specifications that examine the link between any time spent and maternal education. These results are 
presented in Tables 4A-C.   
Across the entire sample in the OLS specification, a child of a mother with some education spends 
43 more minutes on educational activities outside the school (Table 4A, Column 1). In the IV specification, 
the estimates increase to 75 minutes, with some loss in precision. To check that these results are not driven 
by an increase in enrollment, we estimate the same specifications for enrolled children only. The results are 
stable and in this sub-sample, the preferred IV estimate increases to 77 minutes. To calibrate this increase in 
terms of the overall distribution, the 75 minute increase in study time moves a child from the 25th percentile 
to roughly the 75th percentile in the time distribution, and is almost identical even to the point estimates 
reported in Behrman and others (1999). 
Columns 1 and 2 in Table 4B examine maternal time use in helping children with schoolwork. We use 
both the continuous version of the maternal time variable as well as a discrete version, where the outcome 
variable takes the value 1 if the mother spent any time at all on children’s educational needs—informative 
because only 6 percent of mothers fall in this category, with the remainder reporting zero time spent. For the 
sample of all mothers, the IV specifications suggest no relationship between maternal education and maternal 
time spent on children’s educational needs. Although OLS results are significant, the IV coefficient is smaller 
with large standard errors. This could, in part, reflect the low precision of the IV estimator. Therefore, we   18
also present the Average Treatment Effect on the Treated (ATT) from the bivariate probit specification for 
the discrete outcome variable. Here, the results are identical to the OLS specification and highly precise. The 
increase in the probability of a mother spending any time at all is 21 percentage points for mothers with some 
education, which is large given the low overall numbers in the data.  
Following a sample-cut suggested by Behrman and others (1999), we then look at families where 
there is no child older than 12 in the household (Column 2, Table 4B). Although the distinction is 
endogenous, behavior in these households sheds more light on the mother’s role for a couple of reasons. 
First, mothers with the educational levels in our sample may not be directly able to help older children in their 
more complex schoolwork. Second, older siblings themselves could potentially help the younger ones, thus 
decreasing the necessity for direct maternal supervision (see for instance, Tiefenthaler, 1997 on the role of 
older daughters as “mother-substitutes” and Bianchi, 2000).  Finally, younger children may need more direct 
supervision and help in schoolwork so that the time allocation of mothers’ and of other household members 
to these activities could well increase. 
Table 4B shows a large difference by maternal education in the time-use for these households. All 
three specifications using the discrete variable indicating whether mothers spent any time on children’s 
educational activities (OLS, IV and biprobit) are similar in magnitude and suggest an increase between 29 
(OLS) and 23 (IV) percentage points. The biprobit estimate at 27 percentage points lies between the OLS and 
IV results and is larger than the result obtained for all households. Additionally, in these families, mothers 
with some education spend more time—40 more minutes—on children’s educational needs; the effect is 
more precisely estimated in the IV specification than for all families. 
Finally, Table 4C shows that maternal education also has an effect on the contribution of other 
household members to child learning. Using the hours spent in the last week by any family member on 
reading to children or telling them stories as the dependent variable, we find that children living in 
households with “educated” mothers are more likely to be read to, by 23 (OLS) to 26 (biprobit) percentage 
points and that this increase is associated with an additional 4.64 hours (IV) spent on this activity by all 
household members.   19
 These results on maternal and child time allocation paint a picture of the learning environment that 
is very different in households with mothers who have some education. Of interest is that, while time spent 
directly on children’s educational needs does increase for mothers with some education, child study time 
increases even more dramatically. Mothers with some education create a space whereby their children are able 
to spend an extra hour and fifteen minutes each day studying and preparing for school. 
Learning Outcomes 
To assess whether maternal education has an impact on learning outcomes, we matched children in 
our household survey to those who were tested in school through our study in Grade 3, eventually yielding a 
sample of 676 children for whom we have both test-scores and household survey data. The key econometric 
issue that this poses, in addition to that arising from the selection into maternal education, is that the children 
for whom we observe test-score data may systematically differ from children for whom test-score data are not 
available. This arises both because some children are not enrolled, but also because children may be absent on 
the day of the test (10 percent of all children in the relevant grade were not administered the test due to 
absenteeism). Therefore, IV specifications followed for other outcome data may be biased if such selection is 
not accounted for. Following Angrist (1995), the test-score equation is determined through a linear equation 
conditional on the existence of a test-score observation and a censoring equation indicating whether the test 
score is missing. Thus, although presence of a school is a valid instrument for maternal education, it is not a 
valid instrument in equation for selection into the test scores.  
There are two potential solutions. One approach is to follow Heckman (1978). If we assume that 
errors are jointly normally distributed, homoskedastic and independent of the instrument, we obtain the 
familiar "Mills-ratio" as the relevant expectation function conditional on participation. This Mills ratio is then 
directly included in test score equation as the appropriate selection-correction. An alternative approach, 
proposed by Heckman and Robb (1986) and developed by Ahn and Powell (1993), uses the "control-
function" approach, where we condition on the predicted probability in the test score equation. In essence, 
this method proposes to estimate the effect of maternal education by using pair-wise differences across 
children for whom the non-parametric probability of participation is very close. The approach is implemented   20
by first estimating the censoring equation directly, and then including the predicted probability of 
participation and its polynomials as additional controls in the test score equation. 
Specifications using Heckman's selection model and the “control function approach base 
identification on the non-linearity of the selection equation (see Duflo, 2001, as an example). Augmenting the 
instrument set with potential candidates that are correlated to the probability of being tested in school but 
uncorrelated to the test-score can help in identification and the efficiency of the estimator. Following 
literature on the distance to school as a determinant of enrollment and absenteeism in Pakistan (see for 
instance Holmes, 2003), we propose using the distance to the closest eligible school as an additional 
instrument in the selection equation. 
To construct this distance variable, we collected geographical coordinates of all households in the 
household survey as well as the coordinates of all schools in the village. We then computed straight-line 
distances for every household-school pair and computed the minimum distance to an eligible school, 
incorporating both the level of the school and its gender status (boys only, girls only or coeducational) as well 
as the gender of the child. The distance to the closest eligible school is a strong predictor of enrollment, and 
of concern for us, larger distances also make it more likely that the child was not tested in the school as part 
of the testing exercise. 
The results from this exercise are presented in Table 5. Columns 1 presents the OLS specification; 
column 2 presents the results based on  specifications based on the Heckman correction while Columns 3 
present results using the control-function approach. As before, all specifications include a full set of dummies 
for mother's age as well as the birth tehsil (county); in addition, we include additional controls for the age and 
gender of the child. We find a strong causal effect of maternal education on child-test scores in the subjects 
of English and Urdu, with children of mothers with some education reporting test-scores at the end of Grade 
III that are 0.35 standard-deviations higher than those of children whose mothers report no education at all. 
This impact is significant at the 1 percent level of confidence. The effects are smaller for Mathematics, and 
suggest a 0.25 standard-deviation boost for children with “educated” mothers; significant at the 5 percent 
level of confidence. These results appear to be robust to the methods used to control for selection with   21
similar qualitative and quantitative findings, from specifications that account for selection, by specifically 
controlling for the probability of selection (Columns 2-3). The non-parametric approach yields almost 
identical coefficients, and both the Heckman and the control-function estimates are remarkably similar to 
those obtained in the OLS regressions.  
Although fraught with comparability issues, the impact of mother’s education on learning is similar 
to, and indeed in many cases, greater than the impacts of widely reported experimental interventions. The 
language effects in our sample are greater than those associated with an extra teacher or computer-aided 
learning program reported in Banerjee and others (2007). The Math score is comparable to the learning 
incentives experiment in multi-subjects reported in Kremer and others (2009).  
Other Channels: Household Bargaining 
In the literature on middle and high-income countries, maternal education is typically associated with 
greater bargaining power within the household; this is the classic link between education and female 
empowerment. If mothers give greater weight to child outcomes, an increase in women’s bargaining power 
will favor children. Lundberg and others (1997) classic study shows that money given to mothers leads to 
greater expenditures on children relative to money given to fathers. One channel through which this link has 
been posited to work is through greater labor force participation and income generating potential for 
educated women.  
There is little direct evidence for these empowerment/bargaining effects in our data. We test whether 
maternal education affects time spent on paid work time and time spent outside the house. We follow the 
same estimation and reporting strategy as in time use channels. Since paid work by mothers is very low in the 
data, we present both the discrete variable measuring the presence of any paid work and the continuous 
version using daily minutes of paid work. As previously, we present the Average Treatment Effect on the 
Treated (ATT) from a bivariate probit specification for the discrete variables.  
There are several noteworthy “non”-results reported in Table 6. First, the effect of maternal 
education on the time spent by the mother working outside the house is negative in both the OLS and IV (57 
and 84 fewer minutes). It is significant in the OLS but with lower precision for the IV. Second, there is a   22
small effect of maternal education on whether the mother does any paid work at all (-1, 5 and 1 percentage 
points in the OLS, IV and biprobit specifications), but in all cases the effect is not significant. Third, in time-
use we do find and an increase in time allocated to paid-work in the IV specification (59 minutes more) but 
the estimate is imprecise and is not consistent with the negative correlation in the OLS regression. Taken 
across the three measures it is likely that this channel, where education affects paid work and time outside the 
house, which is so prominent in the discussion on developed countries, is missing in this low income country 
environment. 
Given that education does not appear to increase mothers’ outside options, we should also not 
expect to see any changes in the decision making role for the mother who has some years of schooling. Our 
survey asks two questions about the mother’s decision making in their children’s education: whether the 
mother was principally responsible for the child’s enrollment decision and whether the mother was principally 
responsible for the choice of school.  The effect of maternal education is uniformly small and insignificant in 
all three specifications (OLS, biprobit and IV) for both these questions. Finally, we are unable to detect a 
causal effect of mother’s education on enrollment or school choice even though there is a large positive effect 
of maternal education on enrollment and a large negative effect on enrollment in public schools in the OLS 
specification. This is consistent with Black and others (2005), Behrman and Rosenzweig (2002) and a detailed 
survey by Strauss and Thomas (1995) that points out the inconclusive nature of many studies relating child 
outcomes to maternal education.10  
Results on schooling expenditures also confirm that on the intensive margin (allocations conditional 
on school enrollment) maternal education has little impact on child inputs other than the time allocations 
discussed previously. We estimate the impact of maternal education on disaggregated schooling expenditures 
(books and supplies and uniforms and shoes) and total educational expenditures (Table 6). For all three 
outcome variables we are unable to detect a causal impact of maternal education on child allocations. Finally, 
we examined whether the causal impact of maternal education on time allocations for educational needs 
                                                 
10 At the same time, we want to caution against reading too much into this result. Given the relatively small sample, the precision of 
our estimates does not allow us to rule out that the OLS and IV coefficients are statistically the same, and therefore rule out the 
positive enrollment effects of maternal education.   23
extended to children’s general needs. We find no correlation or causal link between maternal time on children’s 
general needs and maternal education. The OLS estimate is precisely 0 and the IV estimate is of the wrong 
sign (Table 6). Take together these results strongly suggest that improvements in education at low starting 
levels do not alter bargaining power within the household. However, education still has an impact. The 
channel that figures prominently and causally is the way in which both mothers and children allocate their 
time in a household learning environment created by “educated” mothers.   
Section 4: Robustness and Limitations 
There are some limitations to the estimates presented here. First, like with all IV estimates, we 
estimate the Local Average Treatment Effect, or LATE. It is likely that the compliers—mothers who shifted 
their education levels as a result of school presence—behave differently from the sample of all mothers 
(Card, 1999). Second, our sample sizes are much smaller than previous studies in the literature (Currie and 
Moretti (2003) for instance, use more than 600,000 observations in their IV sample.). This is primarily 
because there are no standard datasets from low-income countries that allow mothers to be matched to their 
birth-villages. The data therefore have to be collected from scratch and villages have to be matched manually 
after data collection.  We also required detailed data on child learning and time-use that precluded using larger 
pre-existing household surveys. Thus achieving large sample sizes was beyond the scope our data collection 
exercise. Consequently, given the well known problems of poor efficiency in IV estimates for smaller samples 
(in the case of discrete variables, Chiburish and others, 2006, show that effect sizes of 0.15 can be detected in 
95 percent of cases with IV estimates only once the sample size crosses 22,000), several of our estimates are 
plagued by low precision. 
Given the small sample size, we were also unable to include birth-village fixed effects in the primary 
specifications. This introduces a concern that variation across villages in the availability of schools could be 
directly correlated with current child outcomes, perhaps because of the long-term presence of the school 
itself. Table A2 in the Appendix presents the main results in the paper after introducing a dummy variable for 
whether the mother’s birth-village ever received a school; the excluded instrument then captures only the 
variation in age-specific enrollment possibilities for the mother. Our results on the time spent by children in   24
schoolwork at home and the effect of maternal education on test-scores remain unchanged and significant. 
The size of the coefficient on maternal time with children remains the same, but the precision drops 
substantially due to the additional control. Therefore, it is unlikely that particular characteristics of villages 
that received schools explain the variation we now observe in the time-use patterns and test-scores of 
children across educated and uneducated mothers. 
Third, and perhaps critical for our interpretation of the channels through which maternal education 
affects child outcomes, is that our reduced form specifications do not account for sorting in the marriage 
market. If education allows mothers to choose “better” husbands (there is certainly a strong correlation in 
spousal education), we are certainly attributing too much to the direct effects of maternal education on child 
effort. This channel may be qualitatively less important in our case given the gender-segregation of schools in 
Pakistan. Previous studies that use schooling availability as an instrument have to address the problem that 
there is a single instrument that affects both maternal and paternal education; an issue that does not arise 
here. Accounting for assortative mating requires a second instrument (which we do not have) that determines 
the quality of the match in the marriage market. Black and others (2005) suggest that the potential importance 
of this channel can at least be assessed by examining the causal link between maternal education and 
observable spousal/household characteristics and this check is presented in Table 7. Clearly, in the OLS 
specifications, mothers with some education also have more educated spouses, spouses who spend more time 
with their children, live in richer households (as measured by log per-capita expenditures), have smaller 
families are more likely to have electricity (which has been independently linked to child outcomes in other 
studies in low-income countries) and are more likely to live in concrete housing. In both the IV and biprobit 
specifications none of these remain significant, and in the IV specifications the coefficient estimate for 
spousal education, father’s time with children and household expenditures is of the wrong sign. The 
coefficient on the type of housing drops to zero. Nevertheless, there is limited evidence that mothers with 
some education are more likely to locate in villages that are electrified and have fewer children, although the   25
estimate is highly imprecise. We thus note the possible importance of this location and fertility effects as 
independent channels for our results.11 
Section 5: Conclusions 
We are able to demonstrate a causal link between maternal education and time spent by their children 
on educational activities outside school. Our IV estimates suggest that this is as much as 75 minutes more for 
every child. In addition, mothers with some education also spend more time with their children on 
schoolwork, an effect that is particularly large and significant (40 minutes) for families where the mother is 
likely to be the primary care-giver. They also facilitate greater contribution from other household members in 
reading and helping their children with schoolwork. This extra effort put in by the mothers, children and 
households pays off.  Test scores are significantly higher for children whose mothers have some education.  
We believe that these results most likely reflect a direct productivity effect of maternal education or 
an effect on maternal preferences in a context where bargaining power is low or non-existent. The low 
educational achievement of mothers in our sample (as measured by years of education) does not lead to 
greater enrollment and does not affect the school choice decision. In response to questions on mother’s role 
in decision making, “educated” mothers were no more responsible for these decisions than their unschooled 
counterparts. This is perhaps not surprising at such low levels of education and paid work that are typical of 
developing countries. Ironically, these very same mothers with low levels of education do enhance their 
children’s learning, an outcome that is ostensibly much harder to achieve. Mothers do not need to be at an 
advanced cognitive level to make their children study. Perhaps, by spending some years in school, mothers 
learned that learning requires considerable effort. Consequently, they are clearer on the steps (and effort) that 
their children need to take to improve their cognitive achievement. The findings in this paper thus emphasize 
the role of parental-child interaction and child effort in studying as an important channel for improving 
learning.  
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Tables and Figures 
Table 1: Summary Statistics






All Children      
Age (years)  9.97  2.93  4331 
Female (fraction)  0.47  0.50  4331 
Enrolled (fraction)  0.76  0.43  4331 
Educational Activity (minutes/day)  117.30  88.98  4331 
Paid Tutorials (minutes/day)  14.36  39.11  4331 
Study (minutes/day)  57.83  60.22  4331 
School Preparation (minutes/day)  45.11  34.97  4331 
Enrolled Children 
Public Schools (fraction)  0.71  0.45  3305 
Mother Responsible for the Choice of School (fraction)  0.07  0.25  3270 
Mother Responsible for the Enrollment Decision (fraction)  0.10  0.31  3270 
Does anybody help the child or read to him/her? (Y/N)  0.38  0.49  3149 
Time anybody in the family spent helping child or reading to 
him/her (hours/week)  3.00  4.81  3149 
 











School Fees  31.12  55.93  3124 
Supplies  35.90  26.07  3124 
Uniforms and Shoes  41.40  26.34  3124 
 
Mothers 
Education (years)  1.34  2.75  1437 
Educated (Y/N) (fraction)  0.24  0.43  1437 
Age  37.87  7.56  1437 
Girls School Present in Birth Village by Age 7  0.55  0.50  1437 
Time Spent on Children’s General Needs (Minutes/Day)  94.47  141.29  1437 
Time Spent Helping Child With Schoolwork  5.05  22.77  1437 
Was Any Time Spent Helping Child With Schoolwork? 
(Y/N) (fraction)  0.06  0.23  1437 
Paid Work (Minutes/Day)  40.67  131.71  1437 
Any Paid Work (Y/N) (fraction)  0.11  0.31  1437 
Time Outside the House  99.33  157.58  1437 
Time Inside the House  501.88  225.67  1437 
Notes: Data from the LEAPS survey of households in 2004. “Paid Tutorials” are expenditures on private tuitions outside school. All 
expenditures are reported in Pakistani Rupees (Rs.) (at the time of the survey, $1 was approximately Rs.65). 
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Table 2: Time Use, Maternal education and Learning (minutes/day) 
 (1)






Difference in Means 

















15.20               
(1.86) 






























Panel B: Child Time Use 














































Panel C: Maternal Education and Child Test Scores























Notes: Mean and Standard errors in parentheses, t-stats in parentheses for difference in means. Time allocations are based on a flexible 
time-use surveys where respondents tell the surveyors what they did in a typical day during the last week. Test scores are from a 
school-based test administered to all children in Grade 3 in all schools in the village. The results reported are Item-Response scaled 
scores where the distribution was standardized with respect to the universe of test-takers. Numbers reflect standard-deviations from 
the mean. 
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Table 3: First Stage Regressions and Falsification Tests 
Mother’s Education 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)  (6)


















  First Stage Regressions  Falsification Tests 











Girls School Present Ages 8-15       -0.04 
(0.04) 
 
Girls School Present After Age 15        -0.01 
(0.04) 
 
Boys School Present by Age 7        -0.05
(0.04) 
Observations  1437 1437 3305 4331 1437  1424
R-squared  0.162 0.174 0.184 0.171 0.175  0.169
F test: Girls School Present by 
Age 7=0 
12.55 15.86 13.35 14.60   
Prob > F  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000   
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the village level (a): significant at p<0.01; (b): significant at p<0.05; (c): 
significant at p<0.1. Regressions 1, 2, 5 and 6 are at the mother level. Regression 3 is at the enrolled children’s level and Regression 4 is 
for all children. The omitted variable in Equations 1, 2 3, 4 is girls’ school present after age 7 or not present at all. The omitted variable 
in Equation 5 is girls’ school not present at all. The omitted variable in Equation 6 is boys’ school present after age 7 or not present at 
all. All regressions control for a full set of mother’s age indicator variables and fixed effects for mother’s birth tehsil (county). 




Table 4B: Maternal Education and Mother and Family Time Use 





Families with no child above 12
Did the mother spend any time on children’s 
educational needs? (daily) 












Observations  1437 580 
 
Mother’s time spent on children’s educational 
needs (mins/day) 








Observations  1437 580 
Notes: Robust standard errors, clustered at current village level; (a): significant at p<0.01, (b): significant at p<0.05, (c): significant at 
p<0.1. For discrete variables, we report both the IV coefficient and the Average Treatment on Treated using a biprobit 
specification. Girl’s school present in mother’s birth village is the excluded variable in the IV and the biprobit. All regression 
control for full set of indication variables for mother’s age, mother’s birth village tehsil. In addition, Child-level regressions control 
for a full set of indicator variables for child’s age and child gender. 
Table 4A: Maternal Education and Child Time Use 






Child Time on educational activity  
outside school (mins/day) 








Observations  4331  3305 
Notes: Robust standard errors, clustered at current village level; (a): significant at p<0.01, (b): significant at p<0.05, (c): significant at 
p<0.1. For discrete variables, we report both the IV coefficient and the Average Treatment on Treated using a biprobit 
specification. Girl’s school present in mother’s birth village is the excluded variable in the IV and the biprobit. All regression 
control for full set of indication variables for mother’s age, mother’s birth village tehsil. In addition, Child-level regressions control 
for a full set of indicator variables for child’s age and child gender.   34
 










Any time in week spent helping/reading 







[0.09]a  3149 








Notes: Robust standard errors, clustered at current village level; (a): significant at p<0.01, (b): significant at p<0.05, (c): significant at 
p<0.1. For discrete variables, we report both the IV coefficient and the Average Treatment on Treated using a biprobit 
specification. Girl’s school present in mother’s birth village is the excluded variable in the IV and the biprobit. All regression 
control for full set of indication variables for mother’s age, mother’s birth village tehsil. In addition, Child-level regressions control 
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Table 5: Child Test Scores and Maternal Education 
  (1)  (2) (3) 
  OLS  Heckman Selection Control Function
      
English  0.34  0.35 0.35 
  [0.10]a  [0.09]a [0.11]a 
      
Urdu  0.33  0.35 0.35 
  [0.11]a  [0.09]a [0.11]a 
      
Math  0.24  0.25 0.24 
  [0.12]b  [0.10]b [0.12]b 
      
Observations  676  4218 663 
      
Notes: Robust standard errors, clustered at the village level in parentheses; (a): significant at p<0.01, (b): significant at p<0.05, (c): 
significant at p<0.1. The Heckman selection and control function estimates use the distance to school as an additional excluded 
variable in the determination of testing results. The results are presented as the causal impacts of maternal education on standard-
deviation changes in test-scores. All regressions control for a full set of child age indicator variables, child gender and birth_tehsil 
fixed effects.  
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Table 6: Maternal Education, Preferences and Bargaining 
 
  OLS  IV  BiProbit  n 

















Was the Mother Responsible for the School Enrollment 








Was the Mother Responsible for the choice of School 












































Notes: Robust standard errors, clustered at current village level (a): significant at p<0.01, (b): significant at p<0.05, (c): significant at 
p<0.1. For discrete variables, we report both the IV coefficient and the Average Treatment on Treated using a biprobit specification. 
Girls’ school present in mother’s birth village is the excluded variable in the IV and the bivariate probit specifications. All expenditure 
regressions are presented in Pakistani Rupees (Rs.) per month. At the time of the survey, $1 was approximately (Pakistani) Rs.65. All 
regressions control for a full set of indicator variables for mother’s age and mother’s birth village tehsil. In addition, child level 
regressions control for full set of indicator variables for child’s age and child gender. 
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Notes: Robust standard errors, clustered at current village level (a): significant at p<0.01, (b): significant at p<0.05, (c): significant 
at p<0.1. Electricity is an indicator variable for whether the household has electricity; concrete housing is a standard measure of 
wealth and has been shown to be directly associated with better school performance. All regressions control for full set of 
indicator variables for mother’s age and mother’s birth village tehsil. Girls’ school present in mother’s birth village is the excluded 
variable in the IV and the bivariate probit. For all variables, the regressions suggest no causal relationship between spousal 
attributes, spousal time allocation and household-level characteristics with maternal education. 
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Figure 1: Children’s Time-Use and Age, and Maternal education 
 
Notes: The figures show non-parameteric graphs relating child time-use with age for the sample of mothers with some education relative to 
those with no education. To focus on the relative differences between these groups, the vertical axis are different across the graphs. Child 
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Notes: Means and standard error of the mean in parentheses. The table compares attributes of children and mothers for the sample of 
mothers whose reported birth village could be matched to a village in the Pakistani census with the mothers whose villages we were 
unable to find. The reasons for the “missing mothers” are detailed in the text.   40
Appendix: Table A2













Variables        
  All Children Enrolled Children 










Observations  4331 4331 3305 3305
        
  All Mothers Mothers With No Child Above 12
Time spent on children’s educational 














  English Urdu Math  







Observations  4218 4218 4218  







Observations  663 663 663  
Notes: Robust standard errors, clustered at current village level (a): significant at p<0.01, (b): significant at p<0.05, (c): 
significant at p<0.1. In addition to controls set in Tables 4A-C and 5, an extra control for whether a school was always present 
in the village is included in these specifications. All coefficients are similar to those in the previous IV specifications (Tables 
4A-C) although precision is reduced in the case of the mother’s time spent on children’s educational needs in families with no 
child above the age of 12. 
 